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I. INTRODUCTION
The last Commercial Transactions Survey included cases decided under
the Texas Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) through the end of 2013.1
* Professor of Law and Foundation Professor of Commercial Law, Texas Tech Uni-
versity. B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M. Harvard University.
1. The Texas version of the Uniform Commercial Code appears as the first nine chap-
ters in the Texas Business and Commerce Code (the Code). See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. §§ 1.101–9.809 (West 2015). The Code first became effective in Texas on July 1, 1966,
as a separate statute. See Act issued Sept. 27, 1965, 59th Leg., ch. 721, § 1-316, 1965 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1951. It was reenacted in 1967 as part of the Business and Commerce Code, the
first of the codes promulgated under the Texas Codification Act. In that process, the desig-
nation of “Article” in the Official Text was changed to “Chapter,” subsections were desig-
nated by letters rather than numbers, and a period instead of a dash was used to designate
sections. Thus, for example, § 2-204(1) in the Official Text became § 2.204(a) in the Texas
codification. Revisions of the Code that have taken place since 1967 still substitute “Chap-
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This Survey discusses cases decided through the end of 2015. During the
last two years, cases dealing with the sale of goods and negotiable instru-
ments under Chapters 2 and 3 predominated, while only a relative few
cases dealt with bank deposits and collections or secured transactions
under Chapters 4 and 9.
II. DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. CONSPICUOUSNESS & FAIR NOTICE
Under Texas law, it is clear that the definition of “conspicuous” in
§ 1.201(b)(10) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code (Code) is to be
applied in both Code and non-Code cases.2 A clause is conspicuous if it
appears in larger type, in contrasting color, or is stated in some other way
that it would call attention to itself.3 In addition, if a clause attempts to
disclaim liability for negligence, the clause must specifically indicate that
such liability is being disclaimed.4 However, if the affected party has ac-
tual knowledge of the terms of a disclaimer, the disclaimer will be en-
forceable whether or not it is conspicuous.5
The same standards of conspicuousness and fair notice apply to indem-
nity agreements as illustrated by the decision in In re H & M Oil & Gas,
LLC.6 In that case, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District
of Texas held that an indemnity clause was not conspicuous when the part
of the agreement in which it was contained had the heading “Miscellane-
ous,” was not in a contrasting font or type style, and was one of twelve
sections appearing under the same heading.7 But the indemnity provision
was enforceable even though it was not conspicuous, because the indem-
nitor had actual knowledge of the provision.8
In J.C. Penney Purchasing Corp. v. Welco, Inc.,9 an indemnity clause
appeared as one of several printed clauses in light grey print and in a
small font on the reverse side of a purchase order, which was printed on
thin paper and made the text hard to read.10 In addition, the clause was
ter” for “Article,” and still use a period instead of a dash, but now use the Official Text
system for designating subsections. See, e.g., Act issued Sept. 8, 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 921,
§ 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 4582 (effective on January 1, 1996). As currently enacted, Chap-
ter 2 is the only chapter of the Code that retains the older non-uniform system to designate
subsections. In the grand scheme of things, this is a minor point, but it can be confusing
when doing Code research and in correlating the text of the Official Comments (which
have not been adopted in Texas as part of the Code itself) to the statutory provisions. It
can also affect searching on WestLaw and LEXIS if the searcher is trying to track case
interpretations of particular sections of the Code because of the variation in section and
subsection designations over the years.
2. See Dresser Indus. v. Page Petroleum, 853 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Tex. 1993).
3. Id.; see also Littlefield v. Schaefer, 955 S.W.2d 272, 274–75 (Tex. 1997).
4. See Littlefield, 955 S.W.2d at 274.
5. See Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tex. 1990).
6. 514 B.R. 790, 833–34 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014).
7. Id. at 834–35.
8. Id.
9. No. 4:13-CV-684, 2014 WL 6787787 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2014).
10. Id. at *3.
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not in contrasting type and there was no distinctive heading that would
draw attention to the clause. Because the clause was not conspicuous, and
there was no showing that the indemnitor knew about the clause, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas held that the indemnity
provision was unenforceable.11 The district court reached a similar result
in Plasma Fab, LLC v. BankDirect Capital Finance, LLC,12 where a limi-
tation of liability clause in a premium financing agreement appeared in
the same size font in the sixteenth paragraph of a two-column, multi-page
agreement and was not identified by a distinctive heading or other indica-
tion that it limited liability.13 In fact, the heading identified the clause
with the word “Liability,” instead of “Limitation of Liability.”
In Grijalva v.Bally Total Fitness Corp.,14 the membership agreement
for a fitness center contained a clause releasing the center from liability
for injuries that might result from use of the equipment or negligence on
the part of the center or its employees.15 The clause was printed in capital
letters in the membership agreement and included a notice appearing just
above the signature line to alert the signer that the agreement contained
a “Waiver and Release” of liability. The plaintiff admitted that he had
signed the agreement. The First Houston Court of Appeals held that be-
cause the clause was conspicuous and gave fair notice to the signer, it was
effective to bar the plaintiff from recovering for an injury that he suffered
at the fitness center.16
In Matador Production Co. v. Weatherford Artificial Lift Systems,
Inc.,17 the Texarkana Court of Appeals also addressed the issue of
whether a disclaimer of liability and indemnity clause was conspicuous,
but in a somewhat different context.18 In this case, the clause appeared in
six-point type at the end of a six-page price estimate and directed the
reader to the service provider’s website for a statement of the terms and
conditions where the disclaimer and indemnity terms were conspicuous.
The seller argued this made the clause effective. The court of appeals,
however, rejected this argument because the statement in the price esti-
mate itself was not conspicuous and did not indicate that the website con-
tained significant limitation of liability provisions.19 The result in Matador
provides an interesting counterpoint to the decision in One Beacon Insur-
ance Co. v. Crowley Marine Services, Inc.,20 where the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit held that a clause in a repair service order that
incorporated the terms on the purchaser’s website and included the URL
11. Id. at *5–6.
12. 468 S.W.3d 121 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, pet. granted).
13. Id. at 129.
14. No. 01–14–00217–CV, 2015 WL 1544582 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 2,
2015, no pet.).
15. Id. at *1–2.
16. Id. at *5–6.
17. 450 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet denied).
18. Id. at 593.
19. Id. at 594.
20. 648 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 2011).
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for the website was effective to invoke the conspicuous indemnity provi-
sions contained on the website.21 The lesson to be drawn from a compari-
son of these two cases is clear: terms on a website can be incorporated as
part of a written agreement, but the incorporation must itself be conspic-
uous, and the website to which a clause refers should be made readily
available and conspicuously state any disclaimers, limitations of liability,
or indemnity provisions applicable to the contract.
B. ACCELERATION CLAUSES
Under the Code, parties can agree to permit acceleration of a payment
obligation upon default, “at will,” or when a party “deems itself inse-
cure.”22 As developed in Texas case law, unless waived, the party against
whom a debt is accelerated must be given notice of intent to accelerate
and a notice of the acceleration, followed by presentment and a demand
for payment of the accelerated amount.23 To be effective, a waiver must
be “clear and unequivocal” and must specifically state the rights being
waived.24
In Schuhardt Consulting Profit Sharing Plan v. Double Knobs Moun-
tain Ranch, Inc.,25 the holder of a note and mortgage attempted to accel-
erate payment due to a default by the mortgagor.26 After the mortgagor
made several late payments on the note, the mortgagee sent a written
notice stating that payments were due on the first of each month and that
the note would be strictly enforced. This was followed a month later by a
text message, the content of which was not put into evidence. The San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the written notice and the text mes-
sage were insufficient to give the mortgagor notice of default or of intent
to accelerate.27
In Murphy v. HSBC Bank USA,28 the focus was not on the content of
the notice of acceleration, but on whether the party who invoked an ac-
celeration clause had later abandoned the acceleration.29 The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Texas held that an issue of
material fact existed as to whether the note holder had abandoned its
earlier acceleration and could send another notice of acceleration to re-
main within the four-year limitations period applicable to notes secured
by real property when a note holder seeks to foreclose on the property
securing the note.30 The district court reversed its earlier summary judg-
21. Id. at 270.
22. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.309, 3.308 (West 2015).
23. See, e.g., Ogden v. Gibraltar Sav. Ass’n., 640 S.W.2d 232, 233 (Tex. 1982); Shum-
way v. Horizon Credit Corp. 801 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex. 1991).
24. See Shumway, 801 S.W.2d at 893.
25. 468 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied).
26. Id. at 564.
27. Id. at 571–72.
28. 95 F. Supp. 3d 1025 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
29. Id. at 1039.
30. Id. at 1040. On this point, the district court noted that, “When a cause of action
accrues is a question of law for the court, while whether a holder has accelerated a note is a
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ment in favor of the mortgagor and addressed the issue of fact about
abandonment of the first acceleration.31
More than thirty years ago, the Texas Supreme Court admonished
creditors to include a savings clause in their contracts to avoid problems
of usury that may result from careless use of an acceleration clause.32 In
Franch v. HP Locate, LLC,33 the creditor took this lesson to heart and
included a savings clause that expressly limited the interest due on a note
to an amount that did not exceed the maximum rate allowed in Texas.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that this
clause effectively defeated the makers’ claim of usury, and the creditor
was entitled to recover the accelerated principal due on the note along
with an order compelling turnover of collateral securing the note and the
recovery of attorney fees.34
III. SALE OF GOODS
A. SCOPE OF CHAPTER 2
Chapter 2 of the Code applies to the sale of goods. A sale is defined as
“the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price.”35 Goods are
defined as “all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale.”36 If a con-
tract calls for both the sale of goods and the rendition of service, the usual
approach is to apply what is called the “predominate purpose test” to
determine whether the sale or the service was the principal purpose of
the contract.37 By their very nature, distributorship contracts contain a
question of fact.” Id. In the context of this case, as stated by the district court, “unless the
first acceleration was effectively abandoned, continued, or waived, and therefore a new,
independent acceleration invoked in June 2012, HSBC’s second suit, i.e., the instant action,
was outside the four-year limitations period and is time-barred.” Id. at 1029 n.8.
31. Id. at 1040; see also Ward v. Stanford, 443 S.W.3d 334, 346 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2014, pet. denied) (addressing a similar issue and reaching a similar conclusion).
32. See Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Schuenemann, 668 S.W.2d 324, 333 n.6 (Tex. 1984).
In no uncertain terms, the supreme court stated:
[W]e fail to understand why acceleration clauses are drafted which do not
include a sentence expressly disavowing any intention to collect excessive
unearned interest or finance charges in the event the obligation is acceler-
ated. To leave the matter open to doubt is to invite litigation and risk the
harsh penalties of article 5069 [now Tex. Fin. Code. § 305.001 (West 2006)].
Id.
33. No. 3:14-CV-3247-L, 2015 WL 7251678 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2015).
34. Id. at *12.
35. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.106(a) (West 2015).
36. Id. § 2.105(a).
37. See, e.g., Structural Metals, Inc. v. S & C Elect. Co., No. SA-09-CV-984-XR, 2012
WL 4959465, at *9–10 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2012) (determining the essence of the contract
was the purchase of AVC power units not design services for the installation of the units);
Cont’l Casing Corp. v. Siderca Corp., 38 S.W.3d 782, 787–88 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (determining that the dominate feature of distributorship contract
containing a mix of sales and service was for the sale of goods but contract was unenforce-
able for failure to comply with statute of frauds under § 2.201 of the Code); Westech Eng’g,
Inc. v. Clearwater Constructors, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 190, 197 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no
writ) (determining predominate purpose of construction subcontract was for the sale of
goods where subcontractor was to provide equipment for construction project).
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mix of sales and service, but it now appears that Texas law has reached
the point where distributorship contracts are routinely treated as con-
tracts for the sale of goods under Chapter 2.38
In Joniback Management Trust v. Wartburg Enterprises, Inc.,39 the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas had no difficulty in
reaching this conclusion in a contract of indefinite duration entered into
between a South African seller and an American buyer calling for the
distribution of plastic baby seats in the United States.40 However, two
other issues involved in this case required further proceedings. First,
there was a significant dispute about whether an oral agreement between
the parties restricted the ability of the American buyer to sell to whom-
ever it chose. Second, it was not clear whether the seller or the buyer was
the first to cancel or terminate the agreement and whether the cancella-
tion or termination complied with the reasonable notice requirements of
§ 2.106 of the Code.41 Because of these disputed issues of material fact,
summary judgment was denied and the case continued for further
proceedings.42
B. WARRANTY OF GOOD TITLE
Two cases decided during this Survey period provide an excellent illus-
tration of the proof required to prevail under § 2.312 of the Code for
breach of the implied warranty of good title.43 In City Direct Motor Cars,
Inc. v. Expo Motors, L.L.C.,44 a car dealer purchased a vehicle from an-
other dealer. The purchasing dealer sold the car to a retail buyer. Ap-
proximately three months after these transactions occurred, a secured
party asserted that it had a prior lien on the vehicle and sued the selling
dealer, the purchasing dealer, and the retail buyer for conversion. The
purchasing dealer repurchased the vehicle from the retail buyer and filed
38. The seminal case for this approach is E. Hill Marine, Inc. v. Rinker Boat Co.,
where the Fort Worth Court of Appeals noted that “the overwhelming majority of jurisdic-
tions that have considered the question have concluded that distributorship agreements are
subject to the UCC.” E. Hill Marine, Inc. v. Rinker Boat Co., 229 S.W.3d 813, 819 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied). And the court of appeals decided to follow the ma-
jority rule. Id. at 19–20; see also John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 61 SMU L. REV.
657, 662–63 (2008) (discussing E. Hill Marine, 229 S.W.3d 813); D & M Edwards, Inc. v.
Bio-Cide Int’l, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-0670-L, 2009 WL 102732, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14,
2009) (parties conceded that contract for distribution of food processing equipment was
governed by Chapter 2 of the Code).
39. 136 F. Supp. 3d 792 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
40. Id. at 810.
41. Section 2.106(c)–(d) of the Code provide for termination or cancellation of a sales
contract of indefinite duration like the contract involved in the case at bar. TEX. BUS. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 2.106(c)–(d) (West 2015).
42. Joniback Mgmt. Trust, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 821–23.
43. Section 2.312 of the Code provides, in part, that “there is in a contract for sale a
warranty by the seller that (1) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and
(2) the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or other lien or encum-
brance of which the buyer at the time of contracting has no knowledge.” TEX. BUS. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 2.312.
44. No. 14-13-00122-CV, 2014 WL 2553484 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 5,
2014, pet. denied) (mem. op).
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a cross action against the selling dealer for breach of the warranty of good
title. Though it was later determined that the secured party did not have a
valid lien, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals held that the title
dispute interfered with the ability of the purchasing dealer to resell the
vehicle, and that this constituted an encumbrance on the vehicle.45 The
court of appeals, therefore, upheld a jury finding in favor of the purchas-
ing dealer.46
In contrast to the result in City Direct, the Austin Court of Appeals in
Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. ICA Wholesale, Ltd.47 reasoned that Texas
law requires a buyer to show an interference with the buyer’s right to
quiet possession of the goods as a part of the buyer’s claim for breach of
the warranty of title.48 Unlike the situation in City Direct where the
purchasing dealer had to repurchase the vehicle and defend an action for
conversion, the buyer of a manufactured home in Green Tree had suf-
fered no interference with its claim of ownership and introduced no evi-
dence that its right of quiet possession had been disturbed. The judgment
of the trial court was reversed and judgment rendered in favor of the
seller.49
C. WARRANTIES OF QUALITY
The Code provides for three different warranties of quality. The first is
creation of express warranties by the seller’s affirmation, promise,
description, or sample of the goods.50 The second is an implied warranty
of merchantability that generally means the goods will pass without ob-
jection in the trade, are of fair average quality, and fit for their ordinary
purposes.51 The third is a warranty that the goods are fit for the buyer’s
particular purpose.52 This warranty differs from the warranty of
merchantability by requiring that the seller know of the particular pur-
pose for which the goods are to be used, and the buyer must rely on the
seller’s skill and judgment in selecting or furnishing goods suitable for the
buyer’s purpose.53
Until the significant decision in Man Engines & Components, Inc. v.
Shows,54 Texas law had held that implied warranties of quality do not
arise in the sale of used goods.55 In Man Engines, the engines on a yacht
45. Id. at *3.
46. Id.
47. 439 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.).
48. Id. at 660–61.
49. Id. at 662.
50. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.313 (West 2015).
51. See id. § 2.314.
52. See id. § 2.315.
53. Compare id. § 2.315, with id. § 2.314.
54. 434 S.W.3d 132 (Tex. 2014).
55. See, e.g., Bren-Tex. Tractor Co. v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 97 S.W.3d 155, 159 n.8
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Bunting v. Fodor, 586 S.W.2d 144, 145–46
(Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ); Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp.,
500 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.], no writ).
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were replaced in 2000. In 2002, the yacht was sold by the then-current
owner to the plaintiff who purchased the yacht with knowledge that the
yacht and engines were used goods. In 2004, one of the engines failed and
was repaired. A year later, the engine failed again and could not be re-
paired. The plaintiff sued the engine manufacturer for breach of the im-
plied warranty of merchantability. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff,
but the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, relying on the then-existing rule dealing with implied
warranties in the sale of used goods.56 On appeal by the buyer, the court
of appeals reasoned that while several appellate court cases had held that
no warranties arise in the sale of used goods, the Texas Supreme Court
had never ruled on this issue.57 The court of appeals distinguished these
cases on the ground that the plaintiff in Man Engines was not suing the
immediate seller for a breach of an implied warranty that arose when the
plaintiff purchased the yacht from his immediate seller, but instead, the
suit was against the engine manufacturer for breach of an implied war-
ranty that arose when the new engines were sold to a previous owner and
installed in the yacht.58 The judgment of the trial court was reversed.59
On further appeal by the engine manufacturer, the Texas Supreme
Court affirmed the ruling of the court of appeals and held that a remote
purchaser was entitled to the benefit of any implied warranty against de-
fects that came into existence in the sale of new goods to the original
purchaser.60 The supreme court rather colorfully stated, “The defect
doesn’t rub off with use.”61 In reaching this decision, the supreme court
disapproved the holding in Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Machinery Corp.,62
but specifically noted that it was not addressing the issue of whether a
seller of used goods would be liable for breach of an implied warranty
when selling the goods to a subsequent buyer.63 The supreme court tem-
pered its decision by pointing out that the buyer has a duty of inspection,
and an implied warranty would not exist for defects that would be re-
vealed by a reasonable inspection.64 In the case at bar, however, the
buyer had made a reasonable inspection, and the defect was one not re-
vealed by the inspection.65 The supreme court also stated that the rights
of a remote buyer would be no greater than those of the original pur-
chaser, and if implied warranties had been effectively disclaimed in the
original sale, the remote buyer would be bound by the disclaimer.66 Be-
56. Man Engines & Components, Inc., 434 S.W.3d at 134–35.
57. Shows v. Man Engines & Components, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 348, 352 & n.3 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012), aff’d by 434 S.W.3d 132 (Tex. 2014).
58. Id. at 353.
59. Id. at 355.
60. Man Engines & Components, Inc., 434 S.W.3d at 138.
61. Id.
62. 500 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
63. Man Engines & Components, Inc., 434 S.W.3d at 138.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 140.
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cause it had not been raised at trial, the supreme court did not reach the
issue of whether an “as is” sale by the original purchaser to a remote
buyer inured to the benefit of the manufacturer.67
In Becker v. Continental Motors, Inc.,68 a buyer purchased an airplane
engine from a manufacturer for installation in an aircraft owned by the
buyer. The manufacturer provided a “New Engine Warranty” as part of
the transaction that stated the manufacturer, at its option, would repair or
replace the engine or its components for defects in material or workman-
ship for a period of thirty-six months. A separate twenty-four month war-
ranty was provided for the engine cylinders. Both warranties limited the
remedies to repair or replacement and disclaimed any incidental or con-
sequential damages.69
Some seventeen months after the purchase, it became apparent that
the engine had major problems, and the buyer contacted the manufac-
turer to discuss repair. During the next few months, the manufacturer
attempted to repair the engine, but these attempts failed. When it became
apparent that the manufacturer would not attempt further repairs, the
buyer sued for breach of express warranty under the Code and under the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (TDTPA).70 The U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Texas held that the manufacturer had
breached its express warranty by failing to repair the engine and that the
buyer was entitled to recover damages for the cost of replacing the en-
gine.71 In addition, the buyer was entitled to recover attorney’s fees
under both § 38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and
under the TDTPA.72 The buyer also sought recovery for damages result-
ing from loss of use of the aircraft during the time it was out of service.
The district court, however, denied recovery for these damages on the
ground that the terms of the warranty effectively limited the buyer’s rem-
edies and excluded recovery of incidental or consequential damages.73
While Becker involved the application of a limitation of remedies pro-
vision, Luig v. North Bay Enterprises, Inc.74 concerned the interpretation
of a contract that included both an express warranty and a disclaimer of
67. Id. at 141.
68. No. 4:13-CV-520-BJ, 2015 WL 6742104 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2015).
69. Id. at *1–2.
70. Id. at *5. The TDTPA appears as Chapter 17 in the Code. See TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 17.4–.63 (West 2015). Section 17.50(a)(2)of the TDTPA provides, inter alia,
that “[a] consumer may maintain an action . . . [for] breach of an express or implied war-
ranty.” Id. § 17.50(a)(2).
71. Becker, 2015 WL 6742104, at *8.
72. Id. at *13. The recovery of attorney’s fees in actions for breach of contract is per-
mitted under § 38.001 of the Code and the TDTPA. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 38.001; id. § 17.50(d). In Medical City Dallas, Ltd. v. Carlisle Corp., the Texas Supreme
Court held that breach of express warranty claims are founded in contract for the purpose
of recovery of attorney’s fees. Med. City Dall., Ltd. v. Carlisle Corp., 251 S.W.3d 55, 63
(Tex. 2008).
73. Becker, 2015 WL 6742104, at *10.
74. 55 F. Supp. 3d 942 (N.D. Tex. 2014), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 817 F.3d 901 (5th
Cir. 2016).
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warranties.75 In this case, the buyer purchased a helicopter under a con-
tract representing that it would be airworthy, but the contract also stated
that the helicopter was sold “as is,” and the buyer had made pre-purchase
inspections of the helicopter.76 The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Texas held that under § 2.316 of the Code, this language and
the buyer’s inspection were effective to disclaim any implied warranties.77
The express warranty, however, presented a different problem because
of the conflict between the terms creating an express warranty and the
terms disclaiming warranties. On this issue, the district court reasoned
that the contract should be construed as a whole to give effect to both
terms as directed by § 2.316(a).78 Using this approach, the district court
concluded that the specific statement creating an express warranty sur-
vived the general language disclaiming warranties, thus indicating that
the parties had intended the express warranty to not be disclaimed.79 The
seller’s motion for summary judgment was denied, and the buyer’s claim
for declaratory judgment in its favor was upheld.80
Under § 2.607 of the Code, the failure of a buyer to notify the seller of
a breach of warranty within a reasonable time after the breach was or
should have been discovered bars the buyer from any remedy.81 In
Barocio v. General Electric Co.,82 a fire destroyed a home. It was unclear
whether the fire was caused by improper installation of the wiring for the
heating system or by a defective blower fan in the heating unit. Although
one of the homeowners had given notice to the manufacturer of the heat-
ing unit, no notice was given to the manufacturer of the blower fan until
suit was filed against the fan manufacturer some two years and eight
months after the fire.83 The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the
75. Id. at 950–93.
76. Section 2.316(c)(1) of the Code permits disclaimer of all implied warranties “by
expressions like ‘as is’, ‘with all faults’ or other language which in common understanding
calls the buyer’s attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(c)(1) (West 2015). Section
2.316(c)(2) of the Code provides that there is no implied warranty regarding defects that
should have been discovered by the buyer through examination. Id. § 2.316(c)(2).
77. Luig, 55 F. Supp. at 950.
78. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(a) (providing “Words or conduct relevant
to the creation of an express warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit
warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject
to the provisions of this chapter on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2.202) negation or
limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable”).
79. Luig, 55 F. Supp. at 952–53.
80. Id. at 955.
81. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.607(c)(1).
82. No. 07-12-00311-CV, 2014 WL 31255 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 3, 2014, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
83. It should be noted that there is a conflict in Texas law about whether notice given
to one of the sellers in a distribution chain is effective against sellers further up the chain.
Compare Vintage Homes, Inc. v. Coldiron, 585 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso, 1979,
no writ), with Wilcox v. Hillcrest Mem’l Park of Dall., 696 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.—Dallas,
writ ref’d n.r.e.). In Wilcox, the Texas Supreme Court recognized the split, but declined to
resolve it. Wilcox, 696 S.W.2d at 425. In U.S. Tire-Tech, Inc. v. Boren, the First Houston
Court of Appeals reasoned that later decisions of the supreme court on the purpose of
notices under the Code generally indicated that notice should be given directly to the party
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homeowners’ claim against the fan manufacturer failed on two grounds.84
First, because of conflicting evidence on the cause of the fire, the home-
owners had failed to show that the blower fan was the cause-in-fact of the
fire.85 Second, because of the failure to give notice to the fan manufac-
turer within a reasonable time, the action was barred by the terms of
§ 2.607.86 The court of appeals affirmed the take-nothing summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendants.87
In Massey v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.,88 a plaintiff alleged harm
due to a drug prescribed for her cancer treatment. The plaintiff filed suit
shortly before she died, and the suit was continued by her husband as
executor of her estate. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas granted summary judgment on the strict liability and negligence
claims for failure to overcome the presumption that the manufacturer’s
warnings about the drug were adequate.89 In addition, no pre-suit notice
was given to the manufacturer, and this barred any breach of warranty
claims.90 On this point, the district court rejected an argument that the
manufacturer was aware of problems with the drug because of “adverse
event” reports received from other claimants.91 Citing U.S. Tire–Tech,
Inc. v. Boeran,92 the district court ruled that under the Texas interpreta-
tion of § 2.607, notice must be received from the specific plaintiff who is
asserting the breach of warranty claim.93
D. REJECTION AND ACCEPTANCE
Chapter 2 of the Code provides a fairly stark dividing line to establish
the rights of the parties to a contract of sale following the rejection or
acceptance of goods. After a rightful rejection, the buyer has a right to
recover damages for the seller’s breach under § 2.711.94 If goods have
who might ultimately be liable for a breach of warranty, such as the remote manufacturers
of component parts. U.S. Tire-Tech, Inc. v. Boren, 110 S.W.3d 194, 198–99 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
84. Barocio, 2014 WL 31255, at *4–5.
85. Id. at *4.
86. Id. at *4–5.
87. Id. at *5.
88. 46 F. Supp. 3d 688 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
89. Id. at 691–92.
90. Id. at 692.
91. Id.
92. 110 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
93. Massey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 692.
94. Section 2.711(a) of the Code provides:
(a) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer right-
fully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any goods
involved, and with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole con-
tract (Section 2.612), the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done
so may in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid
(1) “cover” and have damages under the next section as to all the goods
affected whether or not they have been identified to the contract; or
(2) recover damages for non-delivery as provided in this chapter (Section
2.713).
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.711(a) (West 2015).
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been accepted, absent proper revocation or breach of warranty, the buyer
is liable for the price under § 2.607.95 National Oilwell Varco, L.P. v.
Flowserve Corp.,96 and Genender v. USA Store Fixtures, LLC,97 nicely
illustrate application of these sections. In National Oilwell, a buyer pur-
chased motors to power pumps in a water treatment plant.98 After deliv-
ery and installation, the buyer discovered substantial oil leakage from the
motors, and the seller’s attempts to cure the problem proved to be fruit-
less. The buyer rejected the motors, purchased replacements from an-
other source, and sued for breach of contract and fraud. The jury
awarded damages to the buyer on both claims. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of the buyer on the breach of contract claim. On ap-
peal by the seller, the First Houston Court of Appeals had no difficulty in
concluding that the buyer properly rejected the goods and dismissed ar-
guments by the seller that the rejection was in bad faith or based on
grounds other than the oil leakage.99 The court of appeals affirmed the
judgment in favor of the buyer.100
In Genender, a buyer purchased shelving for use in her store and
charged the purchase to a credit card.101 After the shelving was delivered,
the buyer had the credit card company charge-back the amount of the
purchase to the seller, but the buyer retained the goods. The seller sued
for breach of contract and attorney’s fees. Referring to § 2.607, the Four-
teenth Houston Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury’s verdict in favor of the seller, and the buyer was re-
quired to pay at the contract rate for the accepted goods.102 The seller
also sought to recover attorney’s fees. The court of appeals, however,
held that the seller had failed to prove that it had made a proper present-
ment of its demand for attorney’s fees as required by § 38.001 of the Civil
Practices & Remedies Code.103 On this issue, therefore, the court of ap-
peals reversed the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees, but affirmed the
judgment for damages in favor of the seller.104
E. DAMAGES FOR FAILURE TO DELIVER
Some cases never die.105 In Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Odfjell
95. Id. § 2.607(a) (providing “The buyer must pay at the contract rate for any goods
accepted”).
96. No. 01-13-00388-CV, 2015 WL 1967490 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 30,
2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
97. 451 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
98. Nat’l Oilwell, 2015 WL 1967490, at *1.
99. Id. at *6–9.
100. Id. at *9.
101. Genender, 451 S.W.3d at 919.
102. Id. at 923–24.
103. Id. at 928; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (West 2015)
(providing, in part, that “the claimant must present the claim [for attorney’s fees] to the
opposing party, or to a duly authorized agent of the opposing party”).
104. Genender, 451 S.W.3d at 928.
105. As a teacher of Contract Law, students sometimes ask why some of the cases in
the casebook are so old. Citgo Petroleum provides a good answer to that question.
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Seachem,106 a buyer purchased a large quantity of cyclohexane to be de-
livered by a designated vessel to Freeport, Texas, from Argentina be-
tween April 15th and April 20th of 2005. The vessel suffered an engine
failure, and the goods were not delivered until June of 2005. Because of
the delay in delivery, the buyer had to purchase cyclohexane elsewhere to
fulfill its own commitments to downstream buyers. The buyer sued to re-
cover damages in lost profits and costs associated with obtaining the
chemical from another source.107 The seller moved for summary judg-
ment because the buyer failed to show the loss was in the contemplation
of the parties at the time the contract was made. Quoting extensively
from Hadley v. Baxendale,108 the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas held that the test of foreseeability announced in Hadley
had been approved by the Texas Supreme Court, by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and had been incorporated into the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts.109 Applying this test, the district court
held that the buyer had the burden of raising an issue of fact about the
seller’s awareness that the buyer intended to resell the cyclohexane and
might lose profit or suffer other damages for a delay in delivery.110 Be-
cause the buyer failed to carry this burden, the court of appeals granted
the seller’s motion for summary judgment.111
IV. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A. INTERPRETATION OF TERMS IN AN INSTRUMENT
Chapter 3 of the Code states some very formal requirements for nego-
tiable instruments.112 One of the most direct statements is contained in
§ 3.114, which states, inter alia, that if there are contradictory terms in an
instrument, “words prevail over numbers.”113 In Charles R. Tips Family
Trust v. PB Commercial,114 a note was issued in the numerical amount of
$1,700,000. Unfortunately for the lender, the amount stated in words was
“ONE MILLION SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO/100
($1,700,000.00) DOLLARS.”115 Applying the rule in § 3.114, the First
Houston Court of Appeals held that words prevailed over numbers and
106. No. H-07-2950, 2014 WL 7004049 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2014).
107. Id. at *6–7.
108. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exchequer Ct.).
109. Citgo Petroleum, 2014 WL 7004049, at *6–7 (citing Mead v. Johnson Grp., Inc., 615
S.W.2d 685 (Tex. 1981); Hector Martinez & Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 606 F.2d 106 (5th
Cir. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1979) (now
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981))).
110. Id. at *8.
111. Id.
112. See generally TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104 (West 2015); id. §§ 3.105–.116
(further elucidating the requirements briefly listed in § 3.104).
113. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.114 (“If an instrument contains contradic-
tory terms, typewritten terms prevail over printed terms, handwritten terms prevail over
both, and words prevail over numbers.”). There are not very many one-sentence sections
anywhere in the Code.
114. 459 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
115. Id. at 150.
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the note was payable in the lower amount despite the large difference of
some $693,000 (six hundred ninety-three thousand dollars).116 An expen-
sive lesson which demonstrates the need for careful review of loan
documents.
In McAllen Hospitals, LP v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.,117 two
people were injured in an auto accident and treated at a hospital. The
hospital filed a lien to secure payment for the hospital’s medical services.
The tortfeasor’s insurance company settled the claims with the victims
and issued checks made jointly payable to the respective victims and to
the hospital. The checks, however, were indorsed only by the individual
victims and paid by the payor bank without the indorsement of the hospi-
tal. When the hospital discovered that the checks had been issued and
paid, it sought recovery from the insurer. The Texas Supreme Court held
that the insurer, as drawer of the checks, remained liable because the
checks had not been indorsed by the holder and, therefore, were never
paid.118 The supreme court reasoned that under § 3-110(d) of the Code,
all persons named as payees on jointly payable checks, taken together,
are deemed to be the holder of the instrument and indorsement by all
payees was required for proper payment.119 In reaching this conclusion,
the supreme court rejected a contrary holding reached in Benchmark
Bank v. State Farm Lloyds.120
The result in McAllen Hospitals was later followed in Viewpoint Bank
v. Allied Property & Casualty Insurance Co.,121 a similar case where an
insurance company made a check jointly payable to a mortgagor and a
mortgagee, but only the mortgagor indorsed the check and received pay-
ment. Therefore, the Dallas Court of Appeals rendered judgment against
the insurer in favor of the mortgagee.122
B. LIABILITY OF MAKERS
Under § 3.412 of the Code, the maker of a note is obligated to pay
according to its terms at the time it was issued.123 Texas law is well settled
116. Id. at 155.
117. 433 S.W.3d 535 (Tex. 2014).
118. Id. at 536–37.
119. Id. at 539–40. On this point, the supreme court quoted a portion of the comment to
§ 3-110, which states:
If an instrument is payable to X and Y, neither X nor Y acting alone is the
person to whom the instrument is payable. Neither person, acting alone, can
be the holder of the instrument. The instrument is ‘payable to an identified
person.’ The ‘identified person’ is X and Y acting jointly. . . . Thus . . . X or Y,
acting alone, cannot be the holder or the person entitled to enforce or negoti-
ate the instrument because neither, acting alone, is the identified person
stated in the instrument.
Id. at 539; see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.110 cmt. 4 (West 2015).
120. 893 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no writ).
121. 439 S.W.3d 626 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied).
122. Id. at 638.
123. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.412 (further providing that a maker is obligated
to pay an unissued instrument according to its terms when it first comes into the possession
of a holder or, if an instrument is incomplete, according to its terms as completed in accor-
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on the elements required for a plaintiff to recover the amount due on a
note. These include proof that the plaintiff is the owner or holder of the
note, the terms of the note, and the balance due and owing on the
note.124 In Jim Maddox Properties, LLC v. WEM Equity Capital Invest-
ments, Ltd.,125 Roth v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,126 Thu Binh Si Ho v.
Saigon National Bank,127 and Lujan v. Navistar Financial Corp.,128 the
courts of appeals used almost identical language to state the requirements
for recovery.129 In three of the cases, the courts of appeals rejected de-
fenses raised by the makers,130 but in Thu Binh Si Ho, the Fourteenth
Houston Court of Appeals held that the maker raised an issue about the
plaintiff’s ownership of the note and reversed the summary judgment that
had been entered in favor of the plaintiff.131 In In re Brooks,132 the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas also upheld a challenge
to the ownership of a note on the ground that the lender failed to show
that the note had been indorsed or assigned to the lender.133 Challenges
to ownership or the right to enforce a note were ruled ineffective in a
number of other cases.134
dance with the rules governing completion or alteration as provided in §§ 3.115 and 3.407
of the Code).
124. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.301, 3.305(b), 3.308, 3.309, 3.401, 3.412
(establishing the requirements for a plaintiff to recover the amount due on a note).
125. 446 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
126. 439 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.).
127. 438 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
128. 433 S.W.3d 699 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.)
129. Jim Maddox Properties, LLC, 446 S.W.3d at 128; Roth, 439 S.W.3d at 510; Lujan,
433 S.W.3d at 701.
130. Jim Maddox Properties, LLC, 446 S.W.3d at 132; Roth, 439 S.W.3d at 512; Lujan,
433 S.W.3d at 705.
131. Thu Binh Si Ho, 438 S.W.3d at 873–74 (further holding that attaching a photocopy
of the note within alleging and providing testimony of ownership was insufficient to prove
a right to recover). In Jim Maddox, the First Houston Court of Appeals rejected claims
that the plaintiff failed to show breach or waiver of the plaintiff’s right to recover. Jim
Maddox Properties, LLC, 446 S.W.3d at 133–35. In Roth, the El Paso Court of Appeals
held that the maker had waived a claim for offset by failing to plead an affirmative defense
of payment at the trial level. Roth, 439 S.W.3d at 513–14. In Lujan, the First Houston
Court of Appeals held that the maker failed to prove any element of a claim that the loan
agreement had been signed under duress. Lujan, 433 S.W.3d at 708.
132. No. 09–38232, 2014 WL 4796937 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2014).
133. Id. at *7.
134. See, e.g., Skelton v. Urban Trust Bank, 516 B.R. 396, 405 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (transfer
by holder without indorsement gave non-holder right to enforce note); Blizzard v. Select
Portfolio Serv., No. 03–13–00716–CV, 2015 WL 5096710, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug.
27, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (blank indorsement effective to transfer note to holder);
Passeur v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 03–14–00376–CV, 2015 WL 5096534, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Austin Aug. 25, 2015, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (transfer of note to holder allowed
holder to enforce note); Deubler v. Bank of New York Mellon, No. 07–13–00221–CV, 2015
WL 3750312, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 15, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (docu-
ments showing assignment effective to transfer ownership of note); DeWeese v. Ocwen
Loan Servicing, L.L.C., No. 01–13–00861–CV, 2014 WL 6998063, at *4 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] Dec. 11, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (transfer by indorsement gave holder
right to enforce note); Das v. Deutsche Bank, No. 05–12–01612–CV, 2014 WL 1022385, at
*3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 5, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (note was properly trans-
ferred to holder by blank indorsement).
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C. LIABILITY OF DRAWERS
Under § 3.414 of the Code, the drawer of a check is obligated to pay
the holder if a check is dishonored by the drawer’s bank.135 In 1/2 Price
Checks Cashed v. United Automobile Insurance Co.,136 the Texas Su-
preme Court held that actions against a drawer were actions in contract
allowing recovery of attorney’s fees.137 In Statewide Hydraulics, Inc. v.
EZ Management GP, LLC,138 the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals
addressed both the liability of a drawer for issuing dishonored checks and
the evidence needed for recovery of attorney’s fees.139 In Statewide Hy-
draulics, a check cashing store routinely processed checks for a drawer.
The parties had an arrangement for the drawer to repay any checks that
were dishonored by the drawer’s bank. In May of 2010, the store hired an
auditor to review its records. The auditor discovered two checks that the
drawer had not repaid. After the store demanded payment, the drawer
provided two payments against the outstanding balance, but even after
those payments, the drawer still owed a balance of $19,695.03. The
drawer allegedly made a third payment against the balance, but the check
cashing store had no record of that payment. The check cashing store
sued the drawer. The trial court awarded damages to the check cashing
store for the unpaid amount and also awarded attorney’s fees to the store
for both trial and appeal. On appeal by the drawer, the court of appeals
upheld the damage recovery, but denied recovery of attorney’s fees for
the appeal because such fees had not been requested by counsel for the
check cashing store and there was no evidence in the record to show the
reasonableness or necessity of the fees.140 The court of appeals reversed
the trial court’s judgment awarding attorney’s fees for appeal and af-
firmed the remainder of the judgment.141
It is elementary commercial law that to become a holder in due course,
the holder must take an instrument for value, in good faith, and without
notice of any claims or defenses to the instrument.142 In RR Maloan In-
vestments, Inc. v. New HGE, Inc.,143 the Fourteenth Houston Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of whether a holder can act in good faith
135. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.414(b) (West 2015) (providing “If an unac-
cepted draft is dishonored, the drawer is obliged to pay the draft (i) according to its terms
at the time it was issued or, if not issued, at the time it first came into possession of a
holder, or (ii) if the drawer signed an incomplete instrument, according to its terms when
completed, to the extent stated in Sections 3.115 and 3.407. The obligation is owed to a
person entitled to enforce the draft or to an indorser who paid the draft under Section
3.415.”).
136. 344 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2011).
137. Id. at 388.
138. No. 14-13-01049-CV, 2015 WL 167160 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 13,
2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
139. Id. at *5–9.
140. Id. at *9–10.
141. Id. at *10.
142. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.302 (West 2015).
143. 428 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
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when the holder takes a post-dated check.144 The majority held that post-
dating, in and of itself, will not prevent a holder from becoming a holder
in due course.145 In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied on cases
decided under the pre-1990 version of the Code and the former text of
§ 3-304(d)(1), which provided, “Knowledge of the following facts does
not of itself give the purchaser notice of a defense or claim . . . that the
instrument is antedated or postdated.”146 In the view of the majority,
omission of this provision in the current version of the Code did not
change the law.147 The dissent, however, argued that the definition of
good faith as it now appears in § 1-201(b)(20) of the Code requires both
“honesty in fact [a subjective element] and observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing [an objective element].”148 In the
view of the dissent, post-dating requires a holder to inquire about the
validity of an instrument to satisfy the objective element of good faith.149
Because no inquiry had been made, the dissent reasoned that the holder
failed take the instrument in good faith.150 Because of its ruling that the
holder became a holder in due course despite the post-dating, the
drawer’s defenses were not effective to prevent recovery by the holder.151
Under both the common law and the Code, a check can be used as the
basis for an accord and satisfaction of a disputed debt to discharge a
drawer from further liability on the debt.152 In Baeza v. Hector’s Tire &
Wrecker Service, Inc.,153 the El Paso Court of Appeals addressed both the
common law and statutory requirements needed to prove that an accord
and satisfaction had been reached between the parties. The court of ap-
peals pointed out that under either theory, the drawer was required to
144. Id. at 360–61.
145. Id. at 363-64.
146. Act of Sept. 1, 1967, 60th Leg., ch. 785, § 3.304(d), 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 2343,
amended by Act of Jan. 1, 1996, 74th Leg., ch. 921, § 1, 1996 Tex. Gen. Laws 3823, 4592.
147. RR Maloan Investments, Inc., 428 S.W.3d at 361–62.
148. Id. at 364–66 (Christopher, J. dissenting) (quoting TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 1.201(b)(20) West 2009)).
149. Id. at 366.
150. Id. at 364. The dissent succinctly explained its reasoning by stating, “With the
change in the good-faith definition, no longer may the holder of an instrument act with a
‘pure heart and an empty head and still obtain holder in due course status’” Id. at 366
(citing Any Kind Checks Cashed, Inc. v. Talcott, 830 So.2d 160, 165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002) (quoting Maine Family Fed. Credit Union v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. 727
A.2d 335 (Me. 1999))).
151. RR Maloan is a good example of the uncertain effect the revised definition of good
faith can have on a transaction. This uncertainty is not limited to checks, but has also
played a part in the context of secured transactions and wire transfers. See, e.g., In re Jersey
Tractor Trailer Training, Inc., 580 F.3d 147 (3rd Cir. 2009) (addressing whether the factor-
ing company that purchased accounts acted in good faith where secured party had per-
fected a security interest in accounts by filing a UCC-1); Experi-metal, Inc. v. Comerica,
Inc., No. 09-14890, 2010 WL 2720914 (E.D. Mich. July 8, 2010) (addressing whether the
bank acted in good faith when it failed to stop fraudulent wire transfers after receiving
notice of suspicious activity).
152. See Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857, 863 (Tex. 2000)
(accord and satisfaction is a contract by which the parties agree to settle a disputed debt);
see also TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.311 (West 2015).
153. 471 S.W.3d 585 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.).
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clearly communicate that a check was being tendered in full satisfaction
of a disputed debt.154 In this case, there was no evidence in the record
showing that two checks sent to the payee were intended to be in full
payment of the debt.155 The court of appeals, therefore, held that the
drawer’s attempt to prove discharge by accord and satisfaction failed
both at common law and under the Code.156
In Leach v. Wilbur-Ellis Co.,157 the maker of a note sent a check to a
creditor that was conspicuously marked as being in full payment of the
debt. The creditor cashed the check but later demanded payment of the
outstanding balance. The drawer of the check (maker of the note) filed a
declaratory judgment action asserting that an accord and satisfaction dis-
charged him from further liability. The terms of the note, however, ex-
pressly stated that any check sent in full payment of the debt was to be
sent to an office specified in the note and that checks sent directly to the
lender would not be effective as an accord and satisfaction.158 Because
the check was not sent to the designated office, the Amarillo Court of
Appeals held that the accord and satisfaction failed.159
D. LIABILITY OF GUARANTORS
Guaranty agreements are very common in loan transactions. Such
agreements can take two principal forms: (1) The guaranty can be part of
the note itself; or (2) it may be contained in a separate agreement of
guaranty. If it is part of the note, § 3.605 of the Code contains an elabo-
rate set of provisions dealing with discharge of “secondary obligors,” the
terminology used by the Code to include guarantors as well as other sec-
ondary parties such as indorsers.160 If the guaranty is in a separate agree-
154. Baeza, 471 S.W.3d at 393–95.
155. Id. at 592–95.
156. Id. The court of appeals did point out that under the Code, there is a slight differ-
ence from the common law approach: The Code requires an instrument on which a claim
of accord and satisfaction is based must be sent in good faith. Id. at 593–94. Although the
trial court may have erred in excluding evidence of good faith intent on the part of the
drawer, this was harmless error because of the failure to clearly notify the claimant that the
checks were intended to be in full satisfaction of the debt. Id. at 594.
157. No. 07–14–00022–CV, 2014 WL 4553204 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 15, 2014, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
158. Section 3.311(c)(1) of the Code provides:
Subject to Subsection (d), a claim is not discharged under Subsection (b) if
either of the following applies:
(1) The claimant, if an organization, proves that:
(A) within a reasonable time before the tender, the claimant sent a conspicu-
ous statement to the person against whom the claim is asserted that commu-
nications concerning disputed debts, including an instrument tendered as full
satisfaction of a debt, are to be sent to a designated person, office, or place;
and
(B) the instrument or accompanying communication was not received by that
designated person, office, or place.
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.311(c)(1) (West 2015).
159. See Leach, 2014 WL 4553204, at *3.
160. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.605. Indorsers, like guarantors, are included
because, by indorsing, they also agree to pay the holder of a dishonored instrument follow-
ing, among others, presentment and notice of dishonor. See id. § 3.605 cmt. 3.
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ment, the law of suretyship will apply.161 In general, there is considerable
overlap between § 3.605 and the law of suretyship. Under both the Code
and the law of suretyship, a guarantor can waive defenses that would oth-
erwise be available to the guarantor.162
In Moayedi v. Interstate 35/Chisam Road, L.P.,163 the Texas Supreme
Court announced a very important rule governing waivers in guaranty
agreements. In that case, the supreme court held that a general waiver of
defenses was effective to waive ordinary common law defenses as well as
a statutory defense of offset based on § 51.003 of the Texas Property
Code.164 In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court and the court of
appeals both emphasized that the terms of the waiver included a waiver
of “any,” “each,” and “every” defense.165 In Holmes v. Graham Mortgage
Corp.,166 and in Hometown 2006-1 1925 Valley View, LLC v. Prime In-
come Asset Management, LLC,167 the courts referred to Moayedi and
161. Id. § 3.605 cmt. 1 (“[The rules of this section] essentially parallel modern interpre-
tations of the law of suretyship and guaranty that apply when a secondary obligor is not a
party to an instrument. See generally Restatement of the Law, Third, Suretyship and Guar-
anty (1996). . . . In the event that a situation is presented that is not resolved by this section
(or the other related sections of this Article), the resolution may be provided by the gen-
eral law of suretyship because, pursuant to Section 1-103, that law is applicable unless
displaced by provision of this Act.”).
162. Id. § 3.605(f) (“A secondary obligor is not discharged under this section if the sec-
ondary obligor consents to the event or conduct that is the basis of the discharge, or the
instrument or a separate agreement of the party provides for waiver of discharge under this
section specifically or by general language indicating that parties waive defenses based on
suretyship or impairment of collateral. Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, con-
sent by the principal obligor to an act that would lead to a discharge under this section
constitutes consent to that act by the secondary obligor if the secondary obligor controls
the principal obligor or deals with the person entitled to enforce the instrument on behalf
of the principal obligor.”); see also Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty § 48
(1996) (stating a similar rule).
163. 438 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2014).
164. Id. at 8; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003 (West 2015) (allowing a right of offset
in certain circumstances where property is sold at foreclosure for an amount less than its
fair market value). The waiver clause addressed by the supreme court stated the following:
7. Guarantor further agrees that this Guaranty shall not be discharged, im-
paired or affected by (a) the transfer by the Borrower of all or any portion of
the real estate or improvements thereon, or of any security or collateral de-
scribed in the Deed of Trust or in any other security document, or (b) any
defense (other than the full payment of the indebtedness hereby guaranteed
in accordance with the terms hereof) that the Guarantor may or might have
as to Guarantor’s respective undertakings, liabilities and obligations hereun-
der, each and every such defense being hereby waived by the undersigned
Guarantor.
Moayedi, 438 S.W.3d at 3. The guarantor argued that the clause should have specifically
mentioned the waiver of rights under § 51.003. Id. at 3.
165. Id. at 8. The language used by the supreme court clearly emphasizes that general
waivers are effective. Near the end of the opinion, the supreme court stated:
Just because a waiver is all encompassing does not mean that it is unclear or
vague. To waive all possible defenses seems to very clearly indicate what de-
fenses are included: all of them. Indeed, a waiver provision such as this one
may be more descriptive to a layperson than a waiver referencing Property
Code section numbers.
Id.
166. 449 S.W.3d 257 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet denied).
167. 595 F. App’x 306 (5th Cir. 2014).
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reached the same result where the guarantors attempted to raise a de-
fense of offset in the face of a general waiver of defenses clause.168
In Berry v. Encore Bank,169 three guarantors signed a guaranty to en-
able a borrower to purchase a yacht. The guaranty in this case did not
include a general waiver of defenses, but instead provided that the guar-
antors were liable as primary obligors and that no demand for payment
need be made on the borrower before the lender asserted a claim against
the guarantors.170 The guaranty also specifically provided that the lender
would not be liable to the guarantors for failure to secure the collateral
(the yacht). As matters developed, when the loan and guaranty transac-
tions occurred, a shipyard was repairing the yacht and held a first priority
maritime lien on the vessel. When the borrower defaulted, the guarantors
raised a defense of impairment of collateral due to the lender’s failure to
obtain priority over the maritime lien. Based on the specific language of
the guaranty agreement, the First Houston Court of Appeals rejected this
defense.171 The guarantors also defended on the ground that limitations
had run against the borrower. The court of appeals rejected this argument
because the guaranty did not require the lender to first proceed against
the borrower.172 Judgment was affirmed in favor of the lender.173
V. BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
A. DEPOSIT OR PAYMENT OF ITEMS BEARING FORGED
INDORSEMENTS
In Coastal Agricultural Supply, Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,174 a
bookkeeper opened a bank account in a name substantially similar to that
of the company at which he was employed. During the next few years, he
wrongfully deposited more than nine hundred checks made payable to
the company into this account.175 When his defalcation was discovered,
the company settled its suit against the bookkeeper and sued the bank
where the fraudulent account had been established on claims of conver-
sion, negligence, and for money had and received. The bank asserted an
affirmative defense to these claims under § 3.405 of the Code and ob-
tained summary judgment in its favor on all but eighty-two of the
168. Holmes, 449 S.W.3d at 265–66; Prime Income Asset Mgmt., LLC, 595 Fed. Appx.
at 309–12.
169. No. 01-14-00246-CV, 2015 WL 3485970 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 2,
2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
170. Id. at *2.
171. Id. at *8.
172. Id. at *5; see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. Alta Logistics, Inc., No. 05–13–01633–CV,
2015 WL 505373, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 6, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (the guarantor
was successful in raising a limitations defense because suit was not brought within the four
year limitations period applicable to the guaranty).
173. Berry, 2015 WL 3485970, at *14.
174. 759 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 2014).
175. Id. at 502.
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checks.176 The bank also sought a reduction in its liability due to the set-
tlement reached between the employer and the bookkeeper.177 The em-
ployer argued that the § 3.405 defense did not apply to its common law
claim for money had and received on the eighty-two disputed checks and
that any settlement credit should be applied to the entire amount of the
settlement and not limited to the amount of the bank’s liability. The trial
court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the bank on both
issues. A limited interlocutory appeal was granted to the employer on
both of these issues.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court on both issues.178 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the Code did not
displace the common law action for money had and received, but that it
did modify the common law by creating an affirmative defense under
§ 3.405.179 The Fifth Circuit held that any conflict between the common
law and the Code could be harmonized by allowing the employer to as-
sert the common law claim, but also allowing the bank to assert the af-
firmative defense provided in § 3.405.180 On the issue of proper allocation
of the settlement credit, the Fifth Circuit held that under the “one-satis-
faction rule,” the credit should be applied only to the amount of the
bank’s liability and not to the entire amount of the employer’s settlement
with the bookkeeper because that amount included a sum for punitive
damages for which the bank would not be liable.181 Because the interloc-
utory appeal was limited to two specific issues, the Fifth Circuit did not
address the issue of whether attorney’s fees could be recovered on a
176. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.405(b) (West 2015) (providing, in part, “For
the purpose of determining the rights and liabilities of a person who, in good faith, pays an
instrument or takes it for value or for collection, if an employer entrusted an employee
with responsibility with respect to the instrument and the employee or a person acting in
concert with the employee makes a fraudulent indorsement of the instrument, the indorse-
ment is effective as the indorsement of the person to whom the instrument is payable if it is
made in the name of that person. If the person paying the instrument or taking it for value
or for collection fails to exercise ordinary care in paying or taking the instrument and that
failure contributes to loss resulting from the fraud, the person bearing the loss may recover
from the person failing to exercise ordinary care to the extent the failure to exercise ordi-
nary care contributed to the loss”).
177. The district court adopted the determination of the magistrate judge that the bank
was protected by § 3.405(b) of the Code as to the checks that had been deposited in person
at the bank. Coastal Agric. Supply, Inc., 759 F.3d at 503–04. The eighty-two checks in dis-
pute had been deposited at ATM machines. Id.
178. Coastal Agric. Supply, Inc., 759 F.3d at 502.
179. Id. at 505–06.
180. Id. at 507–08. In reaching this conclusion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit referred to its own prior decision in Peerless Insurance Co. v. Tex. Commerce
Bank–New Braunfels, and to a decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Bryan v. Citizens
National Bank in Abilene, both of which resolved conflicts between the Code and the com-
mon law by allowing the provisions of the Code to modify, but not displace, the common
law. Id.; see Peerless Ins. Co. v. Tex. Commerce Bank–New Braunfels, N.A., 791 F.2d 1177,
1180 (5th Cir. 1986) (“any inconsistencies between the various elements of the common
law action and the particular provisions of the code be resolved in the Code’s favor.”);
Bryan v. Citizens Nat’l Bank in Abilene, 628 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 1982).
181. Coastal Agric. Supply, Inc., 759 F.3d at 512 (reasoning that the application of the
one-satisfaction rule in Crown Life Insurance Company v. Casteel was squarely in point on
the allocation of settlement credits among joint tortfeasors).
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claim for money had and received.182
In Contractors Source, Inc. v. Amegy Bank N.A.,183 a company hired a
bookkeeper in July of 2007. In January of 2008, the bookkeeper began
stealing funds from the company by submitting the company’s checking
account number and routing information to third-party websites with in-
structions to withdraw funds from the company’s checking account for
the bookkeeper’s personal use. In September of 2010, the bookkeeper
forged two checks on the company’s account and obtained payment from
the payor bank. The company discovered the forged checks when it re-
viewed the September 2010 statement and notified the bank. The bank
recredited the company’s account for one of the checks, but refused to
recredit the company for the amount of the other check or for any of the
funds paid from the account through third-party websites.184 In an action
by the company against the bank, the bank asserted the “same wrong-
doer” rule contained in § 4.406 of the Code as a defense.185 The First
Houston Court of Appeals held that § 4.406 applies not only to checks,
but also to “items.”186 Noting that the term, item, was to be broadly con-
strued under the decision in American Airlines Employees Federal Credit
Union v. Martin,187 the court of appeals held that the non-check draw
requests made through third-party websites were akin to “remotely cre-
ated items” defined in § 3.103(a)(16).188 Based on this reasoning, the
court of appeals held that because the bank had provided the company
with monthly statements for more than two years showing payments from
the company account, the company had failed to notify the bank of unau-
thorized payments within the thirty-day “same wrongdoer rule” as re-
quired by § 4.406(d).189 The court of appeals also rejected a claim that the
bank had failed to act in good faith or with a lack of ordinary care.190
182. Id. at 508.
183. 462 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
184. Id. at 137.
185. Id. at 133.
186. Id. at 135. Section 4.406(d) of the Code provides:
If the bank proves that the customer failed, with respect to an item, to com-
ply with the duties imposed on the customer by Subsection (c), the customer
is precluded from asserting against the bank:
(1) the customer’s unauthorized signature or any alteration on the item, if
the bank also proves that it suffered a loss by reason of the failure; and
(2) the customer’s unauthorized signature or alteration by the same wrong-
doer on any other item paid in good faith by the bank if the payment was
made before the bank received notice from the customer of the unauthorized
signature or alteration and after the customer had been afforded a reasona-
ble period of time, not exceeding 30 days, in which to examine the item or
statement of account and notify the bank.
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406(d) (West 2015).
187. 29 S.W.3d 86 (Tex. 2000).
188. Contractor’s Source, 462 S.W.3d at 134–35; see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.103(a)(16) (“‘Remotely-created item’ means an item that is created by a third party,
other than the payor bank, under the purported authority of the drawer of the item for the
purpose of charging the drawer’s account with a bank and that does not bear a handwritten
signature purporting to be the signature of the drawer.”).
189. Contractor’s Source, 462 S.W.3d at 134–35.
190. Id. at 135–37.
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Summary judgment in favor of the bank was affirmed.191
In Compass Bank v. Nacim,192 the El Paso Court of Appeals also gave
a broad reading to the term, item, and held that debit memos used by a
dishonest bank employee in 2007 and 2008 to withdraw funds from a cus-
tomers’ account for his personal use were items for purposes of
§ 4.406.193 Although the customers’ claims for withdrawals made in 2007
were barred by limitations, the court of appeals held that the claims for
withdrawals made in July and August of 2008 were not barred by the
same wrongdoer rule for two reasons.194 First, the court of appeals ruled
that the bank was not protected by the rule because it failed to show it
suffered a loss due to the customers’ delay in reporting the loss for some
thirty-three days after the statement of account had been sent to the cus-
tomers—three days beyond the thirty-day period provided in the deposit
agreement.195 On this point, the court of appeals reasoned that the bank
had not suffered a loss due to the delay because it had discharged the
dishonest employee before the thirty-day time period had run.196 Conse-
quently, the failure of the customers to notify the bank within the pre-
scribed time period did not deprive the bank of an opportunity to pursue
recovery from the wrongdoer because it already had the information nec-
essary to pursue such a claim.197
The court of appeals also ruled that the deposit agreement was ambigu-
ous about the date triggering the customers’ duty to report.198 The first
sentence of the relevant provision stated, “You agree that you will care-
fully examine each account statement or notice you receive and report
any exceptions to us promptly after you receive the statement or no-
tice.”199 But the last sentence of the same provision stated, “[I]f you do
not report exceptions to us within thirty (30) days after we send the state-
ment or notice to you, we will not reimburse you for any loss you suffer
. . . .”200 The court of appeals reasoned that this ambiguity created a situa-
tion in which the thirty-day period could expire before an account state-
ment was received by the customers.201 This, in fact, is what happened in
Nacim because the customers never received the relevant statement due
to the bank’s error in failing to change the address to which statements
should be mailed. The court of appeals, therefore, upheld the trial court’s
ruling that actual receipt was required to trigger the duty to report.202
191. Id. at 140.
192. 459 S.W.3d 95 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.).
193. Id. at 105.
194. Id. at 109
195. Id. at 104–09.
196. Id. at 107.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 107–09.
199. Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
200. Id. (emphasis added).
201. Id.
202. Id at 109.
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VI. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS
Although not decided under Texas law, Official Committee of Un-
secured Creditors of Motors Liquidation Co. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.)203 is an important decision showing
how a lack of attention to details can have disastrous results for a secured
party. In re Motors Liquidation Co. arose out of the General Motors
bankruptcy reorganization involving loans made to the bankruptcy
debtor (old GM) that was restructured into a new corporation (new GM).
The restructuring plan called for the payoff and the termination of perfec-
tion of a $300 million finance lease made by a lending group to old GM in
2001.204 In 2006, a different lending group made a $1.5 billion secured
loan to old GM. The same bank (lead bank) served as administrative
agent for both lending groups and perfected both the finance lease and
the secured loan by filing proper financing statements in Delaware.205 An
associate at the law firm charged with making the closing arrangements to
pay off and terminate perfection of the lease transaction did a UCC filing
search and located three financing statements, two of them covering the
finance lease and one of them covering the secured loan.206
The associate prepared a closing list and draft documents, including
UCC-3 termination statements for all of the loans. No one at the law
firm, at the lead bank, at the law firm representing the lead bank, or at
General Motors realized that the termination statements covered not
only the $300 million finance lease, but also the $1.5 billion secured
loan.207 After the termination statements were filed, the Committee of
Unsecured Creditors (Committee) filed an action in bankruptcy court
seeking a determination that the filed termination statements rendered
the $1.5 billion dollar loan unperfected, thereby causing the lead bank
and the lending group to lose priority and become unsecured creditors.
The bankruptcy court held that although the termination statement cov-
ering the secured loan was filed by mistake, it was an unauthorized filing
and did not cause a loss of perfection.208 Because of the importance of
the case, the bankruptcy court approved a direct appeal to the Second
Circuit.
The Second Circuit determined that the issue of the effectiveness of a
mistaken filing was one of state law and certified the question to the Del-
aware Supreme Court.209 The supreme court answered that a filing made
intentionally, although with a mistaken understanding about its legal ef-
203. 777 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2015).
204. Id. at 101.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 102.
207. Id.
208. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 486 B.R. 596, 647–48 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013), rev’d,
777 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2015).
209. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 755 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2014).
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fect, was an authorized filing that would terminate perfection.210 After
receiving an answer to the certified question, the Second Circuit held that
the lead bank knew that the termination statements accompanying the
documents in the closing list were going to be filed, and after reviewing
those documents, it authorized the filing.211 It made no difference if the
lead bank did not intend to terminate perfection of the secured loan and
mistakenly granted authorization for the filing.212 The case was remanded
to the bankruptcy court with instructions to grant partial summary judg-
ment in favor of the Committee.213 The net result was the loss of perfec-
tion for a $1.5 billion loan.
B. PRIORITIES
In Inwood National Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank,214 the Dallas Court of
Appeals dealt with the relative priorities of a garnishing creditor and a
bank that had a perfected security interest in funds held in a deposit ac-
count.215 The court of appeals recognized that under § 9.317 of the Code,
a perfected security interest generally primes the claim of the garnishing
creditor.216 In this case, however, the court of appeals had to address the
priority of the bank and the lien creditor in regard to future advances
under § 9.323 of the Code. This issue arose because the bank had the
debtor sign a renewal note more than 45 days after the garnishment was
served on the bank. The trial court reasoned that this was a future ad-
vance that was not made pursuant to commitment, and therefore, was not
protected under the terms of § 9.323.217
On appeal by the garnishing creditor, the court of appeals disagreed.218
Instead, the court held that a note given in renewal and extension of an
earlier loan was not a future advance, but simply a continuation of a debt
that pre-dated the garnishing creditor’s lien on the account.219 The court
of appeals reasoned that the renewal note was not a novation and did not
provide new credit to the debtor that would disadvantage the lien credi-
tor by increasing the amount of the bank’s secured claim.220 The judg-
ment of the trial court was reversed and judgment was rendered in favor
210. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 103 A.3d 1010, 1017–18 (Del. 2014).
211. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 777 F.3d at 105.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 105–06.
214. 463 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.).
215. Id. at 238.
216. Id. at 235; see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.317(a)(2) (West 2015) (a lien
creditor is subordinate to a security interest that is perfected before the lien arises).
217. Under § 9.323(b) of the Code, a lien creditor is subject to future advances made
during a 45-day period after the lien arises, but is protected from future advances made
after that time unless they are made pursuant to an earlier commitment. Id. § 9.323(b).
Referring to this rule, the court of appeals noted, “The purpose of section 9.323(b) is to
protect a judgment lien creditor who has successfully levied on a valuable equity subject to
a security interest from being ‘squeezed out’ by a later enlargement of the security interest
by an addition advance.” Inwood Nat’l Bank, 463 S.W.3d at 235.
218. Id. at 238–40.
219. Id. at 238.
220. Id.
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of the secured party.221
C. DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL
If collateral has been successfully repossessed, a secured party may
have the option of retaining the collateral in full or partial satisfaction of
the debt or selling it at a public or private sale.222 If the secured party
decides to sell the collateral, Chapter 9 of the Code contains several sec-
tions dealing with the giving of notice and accounting for the proceeds of
sale.223 Under § 9.610, a sale must be conducted in a commercially rea-
sonable manner.224 In Plains Capital Bank v. Jani,225 a secondary obligor
challenged the commercial reasonableness of a secured party’s disposi-
tion of accounts securing a loan. In commercial cases, when such a chal-
lenge is made, § 9.626(a)(2) of the Code requires the secured party to
prove that the disposition was commercially reasonable.226 If the secured
party fails to carry this burden, the liability of the debtor or secondary
obligor is limited to an amount calculated under the formula stated in
§ 9.626(a)(3).227 The jury returned a verdict pursuant to instructions
drafted in accordance with § 9.626, and the trial court offset the amount
found by the jury against the damages claimed by the secured party, re-
221. Id. at 241–42.
222. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.620 (West 2015) (In commercial cases, the
secured party always has the option of keeping collateral in full or partial satisfaction of a
debt (strict foreclosure). In consumer cases, the option of keeping collateral in partial satis-
faction is not available and, if more than sixty percent of the price has been paid, neither is
keeping the collateral in full satisfaction and the collateral must be sold).
223. See, e.g., id. §§ 9.610–.616.
224. Id. § 9.610(b) (providing, in part, “Every aspect of a disposition of collateral, in-
cluding the method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be commercially
reasonable.”
225. No. 02-14-0149-CV, 2015 WL 7303934 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 19, 2015, pet.
denied).
226. Section 9.626(a)(2) of the Code provides:
(a) In an action arising from a transaction, other than a consumer transac-
tion, in which the amount of a deficiency or surplus is in issue, the following
rules apply:
. . .
(2) If the secured party’s compliance is placed in issue, the secured party has
the burden of establishing that the collection, enforcement, disposition, or
acceptance was conducted in accordance with this subchapter.
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.626(a)(2).
227. Section 9.626(a)(3) of the Code provides:
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-628, if a secured party fails to
prove that the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance was con-
ducted in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter relating to collec-
tion, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance, the liability of a debtor or a
secondary obligor for a deficiency is limited to an amount by which the sum
of the secured obligation, expenses, and attorney’s fees exceeds the greater
of:
(A) the proceeds of the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance;
or
(B) the amount of proceeds that would have been realized had the noncom-
plying secured party proceeded in accordance with the provisions of this sub-
chapter relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance.
Id. § 9.626(a)(3).
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sulting in a net judgment of zero. The trial court entered a take-nothing
judgment against both parties.228 On appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals found no error in the trial court’s application of Chapter 9 and af-
firmed the judgment.229
VII. CONCLUSION
As usual, Texas has contributed its share of cases to Code learning, a
few of which have settled previously open questions. It is somewhat sur-
prising that relatively few secured transaction cases were decided under
Chapter 9 during the Survey period, but this may be because attorneys
have adjusted to the changes made to Chapter 9 in 2001 and in 2013 that
clarified many of the issues that led to problems under the former
version.
228. Plains Capital Bank, 2015 WL 7303934, at *3.
229. Id. at *4–5.
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